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Abstract
In 2008, GMAC was a $200 billion company providing financing to General Motors
customers. As the Global Financial Crisis entered a critical stage in early 2008, GMAC’s
funding strategy and liquidity position were adversely affected by the significant disruption
in credit markets and the broader economic downturn. This reduced access to financing,
which impacted GMAC’s ability to provide automotive wholesale inventory and retail
financing to General Motors and Chrysler. In late 2008 and early 2009 GM and Chrysler
underwent a complex restructuring process. To restore liquidity to GMAC’s auto finance
business, the Federal Reserve agreed to expedite GMAC’s conversion to a bank holding

1 This case is one of eight Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) modules considering the various elements

of the government’s rescue of the US auto industry and published 2022:
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module A: Automotive Bridge Loans” by Alexander Nye.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module B: Restructuring General Motors Through Bankruptcy”
by Kaleb B. Nygaard.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module C: Restructuring Chrysler Through Bankruptcy” by
Alexander Nye.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module D: Emergency Assistance to Ally Financial (formerly
GMAC)” by Riki Matsumoto and Kaleb B. Nygaard.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module E: Emergency Assistance for Chrysler Financial” by
Alexander Nye.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module F: Auto Supplier Support Program” by Riki Matsumoto.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module G: The Auto Warranty Commitment Program” by
Benjamin Henken.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module Z: Overview” by Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Greg Feldberg,
Alexander Nye, and Andrew Metrick.
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-offinancial-crises/.
2 Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.
3 Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.
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company and to provide access to several of its and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation’s emergency liquidity programs, which GMAC used heavily throughout 2009
and 2010. The FDIC also provided GMAC with access to its Temporary Liquidity Guarantee
Program. The US Treasury agreed to provide capital under the Automotive Industry
Financing Program authorized under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.
From December 2008 to December 2009, the Treasury invested $17.2 billion into GMAC.
When the last of the government-held shares were sold in December 2014, taxpayers had
recouped $19.6 billion, for a net return of $2.4 billion.

Keywords: Ally Financial, auto finance companies, Automotive Industry Financing
Program, Chrysler, EESA, General Motors, GMAC
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Emergency Financial Assistance to Ally Financial
(formerly GMAC)
At a Glance
As the Global Financial Crisis entered a
critical stage in early 2008, credit markets
tightened and the broader economy turned
down. Because of the size and importance
to the economy of General Motors (GM) and
Chrysler, the government decided in
December 2008 to provide assistance to
the automakers to sustain them while they
developed plans to restructure. A
significant portion of both GM’s wholesale
inventory and retail financing to dealers
and customers was provided by the auto
finance unit of GMAC, a GM subsidiary.
GMAC’s ability to continue to provide
financing for GM dealers and customers
was critical to the manufacturer’s ability to
restructure its business and avoid failure.
GMAC was also expected to become a
lender and play a role in Chrysler’s
restructuring. However, GMAC’s funding
strategy and liquidity position were also
being negatively impacted by market
stresses and GM’s difficulties.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To stabilize GMAC so that it could continue
to provide wholesale and retail financing to GM and
Chrysler dealers and customers.
Announcement date
December 29, 2008
Operational date

December 30, 2008

End of issuance
window

December 19, 2014

Legal authority

Federal Reserve Act; FDIC
Act, Systemic Risk
Exception; Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act
of 2008

Total liquidity
support

$15.3 billion (Federal
Reserve);
$7.4 billion (FDIC)

Total TARP
investment

$17.2 billion ($19.6 billion in
total return)

Participants

GMAC (later Ally Financial)

Administrators

Federal Reserve, US
Treasury, FDIC

The government assisted GMAC in developing a strategy to maintain its viability. GMAC
accessed the Federal Reserve discount window and applied to convert to a bank holding
company. The Fed approved the conversion on an expedited basis, providing access to
several of its emergency liquidity programs, which GMAC—renamed Ally Financial—used
heavily throughout 2009 and 2010. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) also
guaranteed new debt issuance by GMAC through the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee
Program (TLGP). From December 2008 to December 2009, the US Treasury invested $17.2
billion in GMAC stock as part of the Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP), which
it had created under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA). When the
government sold the last of its shares in GMAC in December 2014, taxpayers had recouped
$19.6 billion for a net return of $2.4 billion.
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Summary Evaluation
GMAC’s return to profitability and access to public funding markets suggests that the
government’s assistance, as a whole, provided enough support for GMAC to eventually stand
on its own. There have not been any academic reviews of the government’s interactions with
GMAC. However, there was one useful, public commentary in a March 2010 Congressional
Oversight Panel. The executive summary outlines the underlying purpose of GMAC’s rescue:
“There is no doubt that Treasury’s actions to preserve GMAC played a major role in
supporting the domestic automotive industry” (COP 2010). A 2015 Congressional Research
Service report noted that the decision to make (or switch to) common equity investments
meant that the Treasury took on additional risk. In 2014, the final shares were sold for a
profit; however, at the time of the investment this was far from
a sure bet.
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Emergency Assistance for GMAC: United States Context 2008–2009
GDP
$14,559.5 billion in 2008
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$14,628.0 billion in 2009
USD)
GDP per capita
$48,383 in 2008
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$47,100 in 2009
USD)
As of Q4, 2008:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior
debt)
As of Q4, 2009:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008
Size of banking system
$9,789.1 billion in total assets in 2009
Size of banking system as a percentage of
68.3% in 2008
GDP
66.9% in 2009
Banking system assets equal to 30.5% of
Size of banking system as a percentage of
financial system in 2008
financial system
Banking system assets equal to 30.2% of
financial system in 2009
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008
44.3% of total banking assets in 2009
Five-bank concentration of banking system

Foreign involvement in banking system

18% of total banking assets in 2008
16% of total banking assets in 2009

Government ownership of banking system

0% of banks owned by the state in 2008
0% of banks owned by the state in 2009

Existence of deposit insurance

100% insurance on deposits up to
$250,000 in 2008
100% insurance on deposits up to
$250,000 in 2009

Sources: Bloomberg; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; World Bank, Bank Regulation
and Supervision Survey; World Bank Global Financial Development Database.
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Overview

Background
The Global Financial Crisis that began in the summer of 2007 with a decline in the United
States subprime mortgage markets entered a critical stage in early 2008 (FRBSL n.d.). As the
crisis unfolded, credit markets tightened and a broader economic downturn developed; the
auto industry was hit particularly hard (BLS n.d.). The crisis intensified a decade-long decline
of the largest US auto manufacturers (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 36, figure). Because of their
size and importance to the economy, the government determined, beginning in December
2008, to provide assistance to General Motors (GM) and Chrysler Holdings (Chrysler) while
the automakers developed plans to restructure. GM and Chrysler eventually required
substantial government financial assistance and underwent US Treasury–assisted
restructurings and bankruptcies. The Treasury’s assistance quickly expanded beyond the
manufacturers to include their auto financing companies (Treasury 2014b).
The primary source of financing for GM’s dealers and consumers was the automobile finance
unit of GMAC Financial Services. While GMAC had begun as a captive subsidiary of GM, by
2006, its $200-plus billion business4 had expanded beyond auto financing to include real
estate and insurance.5 That year, GMAC was spun off as an independent company. However,
GM retained a significant ownership interest, and certain “captive” aspects were retained
with respect to the automobile financing business (Treasury 2014b)
In 2008, GMAC’s share of GM retail sales and sales to dealers were 32% and 81%,
respectively. Thus, GMAC’s ability to continue to provide financing for GM dealers and
customers was critical to the manufacturer’s ability to restructure its business and avoid
failure (GMAC LLC 2009a). However, GMAC’s funding strategy and liquidity position were
also being negatively impacted by volatility in the capital markets and diminished access to
liquidity, which resulted in increased borrowing costs (GMAC 2008b). Moreover, GMAC’s
mortgage origination and servicing subsidiary, Residential Capital, LLC (Massad 2012) was
significantly adversely affected through its exposure to mortgage markets and had to be
propped up by GMAC (Massad 2012). Over the course of 2007 and 2008, ResCap posted
losses of $10 billion, while GMAC’s auto finance operation lost about $0.6 billion (GMAC 2008
10-K, 27). The losses. This negatively affected GMAC’s credit rating, which further increased
borrowing costs and access to debt capital markets (Nygaard n.d.). In the third quarter of

4

GMAC was renamed Ally Financial in 2010. However, GMAC/GMAC Inc./GMAC LLC/GMAC Financial
Services/Ally will be referred to as GMAC throughout this case for the purpose of consistency.
5 In a press release of December 24, 2008, the company described itself as follows, “GMAC Financial Services is
a global finance company operating in and servicing North America, South America, Europe and Asia-Pacific.
GMAC specializes in automotive finance, real estate finance, insurance, commercial finance and online banking.
As of Dec. 31, 2007, the organization had $248 billion in assets and serviced 15 million customers” (GMAC
Financial 2008d).
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2008, GMAC reported a net loss of $2.5 billion; since mid-2007, it had reported cumulative
losses of $7.9 billion (COP 2011).
The US Treasury determined that GM could not survive without GMAC’s crucial dual role in
providing financing to GM consumers and auto dealers (Treasury 2014b). An estimated 80
to 90% of consumers finance or lease their vehicles (COP 2010), and GMAC facilitated more
than 30% of GM retail sales. GMAC also facilitated over 80% of the financing that the GM
dealers network received to buy new vehicles for inventory, known as floor plan financing
(GMAC 2008b). Moreover, in November 2006, in connection with the spin-off of GMAC from
GM, GMAC and GM agreed that, subject to certain conditions and limitations, whenever GM
offered vehicle financing and leasing incentives to customers, it would do so exclusively
through GMAC (Ally Financial 2012). Consequently, due to the interdependence between GM
and GMAC, GMAC’s ability to continue funding the manufacturer-dealer-consumer credit
channel was critical to GM’s survival.
Program Description
To restore liquidity to GMAC’s auto finance business, the government intervened with
assistance in a variety of forms, including liquidity and capital assistance, originating from a
number of agencies. GMAC accessed programs and worked with policy makers at the Federal
Reserve (through efforts and programs including: bank holding company conversion, the
discount window, the Term Auction Facility, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, and the
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility), the FDIC (the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee
Program), and the Treasury (multiple capital injections). Each of these programs and
interactions are outlined in the following sections and summarized in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Federal Assistance to GMAC
Agency

Facility Accessed

Type of Assistance

Amount Utilized

Discount window & Term Auction Facility
(TAF)

Short-term lending

$5.0 billion

Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)

Support for issuance of
commercial paper

$7.6 billion

Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
(TALF)

Support for issuance of
asset-backed securities

$2.7 billion in eligible
transactions, of which
$533 million utilized
TALF

Conversion to a bank holding company

Status change and
facilitated legal access to
other facilities
n/a

Federal
Reserve

FDIC

Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
(TLGP)

Guarantee of new debt

$7.4 billion

Treasury

Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP)

Capital investments

$17.2 billion

Source: Federal Reserve.

Federal Reserve Liquidity Facilities
Discount Window and Term Auction Facility
One of GMAC’s subsidiaries was an industrial loan company (ILC),6 GMAC Bank (BdofGov
2008e), and as such it was eligible to access the Fed’s discount window, the Fed’s main
vehicle for providing overnight lending to eligible depository institutions at favorable rates,
fulfilling its lender-of-last-resort role for the banking system. However, it appears that GMAC
had not applied to access the discount window until September 2008, which requires making
an application, establishing an account, and posting collateral with the Fed to secure any

“ILCs are state-chartered banks that have direct access to the federal safety net—deposit insurance and the
Federal Reserve’s discount window and payments system—and have virtually all of the deposit-taking, lending,
and other powers of a full-service commercial bank. Despite their access to the federal safety net and broad
powers, these banks operate under a special exception to the federal Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act).
This special exception allows any type of firm, including a commercial firm or foreign bank, to acquire and
operate an ILC chartered in one of a handful of states outside the framework of federal supervision of the parent
holding company and without the restrictions on the scope of activities conducted by the ILC’s affiliates that
govern the ownership of insured banks by bank holding companies” (Alvarez 2006).
6
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loans. GMAC was granted access to the discount window on September 11, 20087 (GMAC LLC
2008).
Earlier in the crisis, the Fed had established the Term Auction Facility (TAF), a liquidity
program designed to counter any stigma related to borrowing through the discount window
that made banks reluctant to borrow there. The TAF provided liquidity through the auction
of a pre-announced quantity of collateralized credit for a term of 28 or 84 days (GMAC LLC
2009a). All banks eligible for primary credit under the discount window were eligible to
borrow under the TAF.
By the end of September 2008, GMAC had pledged $5.2 billion of automotive loans and
leasing financings as collateral to the two facilities, which provided to it a borrowing capacity
of $4.1 billion (GMAC LLC 2008). GMAC’s capacity and quarter-end outstanding borrowings
can be seen in the Figure 2, with a maximum outstanding amount of $5 billion (Nygaard n.d.).
Figure 2: GMAC Borrowings: Discount Window & Term Auction Facility (in $ billions)

Source: GMAC SEC filings.

Commercial Paper Funding Facility
On October 27, 2008, the Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF),
which provided funding for third parties to purchase highly rated unsecured and assetbacked commercial paper from eligible primary dealers, began operations (BdofGov n.d.).
GMAC Bank, via a subsidiary,8 was eligible to participate in this facility, and by the end of
2008, GMAC had $7.6 billion of outstanding commercial paper through the CPFF (GMAC LLC
An application and completion of certain administrative forms and steps are required before an entity can
access Discount Window lending.
8 The subsidiary was called the New Center Asset Trust (NCAT).
7
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2009a). By March of 2009, the total outstanding had decreased slightly, to $6.1 billion. By
April 2009, most of the issued commercial paper had matured and was not renewed (GMAC
LLC 2009b).
GMAC Bank’s use of the CPFF was cut short due to ratings downgrades. On November 25,
2008, GMAC’s commercial paper was downgraded below the CPFF’s eligibility requirement,
and GMAC was granted two months to improve the credit rating (GMAC 2009a). GMAC was
unable to do so and began an orderly wind-down of its commercial paper trust in January
2009 (GMAC LLC 2009b).
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF)
GMAC also participated in a Fed program that supported issuance of asset-backed securities,
the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). TALF allowed eligible institutions9
to borrow from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) using, among other types,
auto loan asset-backed securities as collateral (BdofGov 2008c). Between September 2009
and March 2010, GMAC executed three TALF-eligible transactions worth a total of $2.7
billion (Nygaard n.d.). All institutions buying the securities from GMAC were eligible for the
TALF; however, of the total $2.7 billion issued, investors that accessed the TALF accounted
for $533 million (BdofGov 2011).
GMAC Becomes a Bank Holding Company (BHC)
On November 20, 2008, GMAC Bank requested approval from the Utah Department of
Financial Institutions to convert from an industrial loan company to a state-chartered
commercial bank (COP 2010; GMAC Financial 2008a). Simultaneously, GMAC, the parent
company, applied to the Federal Reserve to convert to a bank holding company. The Federal
Reserve approved GMAC’s application, subject to certain conditions, under an expedited
process, for the conversion of both the subsidiary bank and the bank holding company on
December 24, 2008 (BdofGov 2008e). Not only did this change in status provide the
companies access to additional government funding facilities, it also affected outstanding
private debt exchange offers and cash tender offers that had been contingent on these
conversions. Reporting on the BHC conversion approval, the Wall Street Journal said, “In a
rare sign of discord within the Fed over the emergency move, Governor Elizabeth Duke, a
Virginia banker who joined the board in August, voted against the move. The Fed didn't
explain her objections in its approval statement. The Fed also denied a request from an
unnamed commenter for a public hearing on the decision” (Hilsenrath and Saha-Bubna
2008).
After the spinoff in 2006, the ownership structure of GMAC was such that GM held a 49%
stake and an investment consortium led by Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. (Cerberus)
held the majority 51% stake (GMAC LLC 2008). The BHC conversion was contingent on a
number of ownership and management changes in order to be consistent with the Fed policy
on non-controlling investments in bank holding companies and banks (BdofGov 2008e).

9

See FRBNY 2010 for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s description of eligible borrowers.
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To avoid becoming a bank holding company itself, GM was required to reduce its ownership
in GMAC to less than 10%. The remaining equity interest was transferred to an independent
trust run by a trustee approved by the Fed and the US Treasury with the mandate to dispose
of the equity interests within three years. GM also agreed to amend its agreements with
GMAC to remove restrictions on GMAC’s ability to engage in transactions with unrelated
parties and to ensure that GMAC controlled its own financing arrangements (BdofGov
2008e). The transfer to the independent trust was executed in May 2009 (COP 2010).
Figure 3: GMAC Ownership Structure
GMAC’s
Shareholders

Before Treasury
Investment

GM

Cerberus
consortium

After Treasury Investment

49%

Less than 10%

51%

Less than 33% total (no member of the
consortium could hold or control 5% or more of
voting shares and 7.5% of total equity)

Source: BdofGov 2008e.

Each Cerberus fund within the consortium was also required to distribute its GMAC interests
to its respective investors, who agreed to reduce their individual equity holdings in GMAC to
less than 7.5%, or less than 33% collectively (BdofGov 2008e).
As part of the BHC conversion, GMAC was also required to restructure its board of directors.
The new board of directors included: the GMAC CEO, a director appointed by Cerberus, two
appointed by the independent trust, and three additional independent directors appointed
by the first four (SIGTARP 2009).
A congressional report stated, based on interviews with GMAC staff, that the reasons that
GMAC sought to convert to a BHC were to access certain government programs established
to address the financial crisis. As a BHC, GMAC could access the FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity
Guarantee Program (TLGP) and the TARP’s Capital Purchase Program (CPP). The TLGP
provided an FDIC guarantee for new debt that GMAC issued (with certain restrictions) and a
guarantee of its transaction account deposits. The CPP, administered by Treasury, made
government capital injections of preferred stock into financial companies if they could not
raise such funds in the markets. Although GMAC Bank, as an ILC, would have been eligible to
receive CPP funds, its parent would not have been prior to conversion into a BHC (COP 2010).
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The FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
In an extraordinary measure, the Treasury, the Fed, and the FDIC each issued individual
statements10 and together issued a joint statement on the morning of October 14, 2009. The
FDIC announced the creation of the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP). The
joint statement indicated that the program was being created under the systemic risk
exception11 of the FDIC Act as signed by the Secretary of the Treasury (Treasury 2008c). The
TLGP was a voluntary program that allowed banks, thrifts, and their holding companies to
issue senior unsecured debt with a full guarantee from the FDIC (Bair 2008).
The TLGP had two components. Under the first FDIC Chair Sheila Bair was reluctant to
extend the TLGP’s guarantee to GMAC’s debt, given the ongoing losses at ResCap and
lingering risks in its auto finance business. On March 19, 2009, the Fed Chairman and
Treasury Secretary sent the FDIC a “comfort letter” promising to use their best efforts to
protect the FDIC from losses on debt guarantees. Bair finally agreed to guarantee GMAC’s
debt after the Treasury increased the FDIC’s credit line and supported legislation to allow
the FDIC to impose an assessment on the biggest banks in the country (Bair 2013, p.
176).GMAC was ultimately authorized by the FDIC to issue up to $7.4 billion of senior
unsecured debt under the TLGP for a fee. GMAC issued a total of $4.5 billion in the second
quarter of 2009, $1 billion of which had a floating rate and $3.5 billion had a fixed rate. Both
had terms ending in December of 2012. On October 30, 2009, GMAC issued an additional $2.9
billion in fixed-rate debt, borrowing up to the limit of the FDIC’s approved usage of the TLGP
(GMAC 2009b). The $2.9 billion and $4.5 billion were repaid in full in October and December
2009, respectively (Ally Financial 2012).
, the Debt Guarantee Program (DGP), the FDIC, for a fee, provided a limited-term guarantee
for senior unsecured debt issued on or between April 1, 2009, and October 31, 2009, by
eligible participating entities (banks and thrifts but also bank, thrift, and financial holding
companies and eligible bank affiliates). Eligible securities would be guaranteed through the
earlier of their maturity or December 31, 2012. Under the second component, the
Transaction Account Guarantee Program (TAGP), the FDIC would fully guarantee certain
non-interest-bearing transaction deposit accounts (Bair 2008).
Treasury Capital Investments
Between December 2008 and December 2009, the US Treasury invested more than $17.2
billion into GMAC (Treasury 2014a). The investment was spread out over a series of three

The Federal Reserve announced the Commercial Paper Funding Facility and the Treasury announced the
Capital Purchase Program. The announcements also indicated that nine large financial institutions had already
committed to participating in both programs (Treasury 2008c).
11 This was only the second time that the FDIC board had approved a systemic risk exception, which required
a finding by the Secretary of the Treasury; the first had been just two weeks earlier to assist Wachovia. See
Davison 2019 for a detailed discussion of the TLGP. The TLGP had two components. “It provided a limited-term
guarantee for certain newly issued debt not only of banks and thrifts but also of bank, thrift, and financial
holding companies and eligible bank affiliates (the Debt Guarantee Program, or DGP). Additionally, the TLGP
fully guaranteed certain non-interest-bearing transaction deposit accounts (the Transaction Account
Guarantee Program, or TAGP). (FDIC 2008)
10
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installments: (1) $5.3 billion as part of the funding round required by the Federal Reserve in
GMAC’s BHC conversion; (2) $7.9 billion to assist GMAC in meeting the capital level required
by the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) stress test; and (3) $4 billion in
additional capital when the initial $7.9 billion failed to fully satisfy the SCAP requirement on
its own (Nygaard n.d.).
BHC Conversion
One of the Federal Reserve’s stipulations for GMAC during its conversion to a BHC was that
it raise its capital levels by approximately $7 billion, from $23 billion to $30 billion (SIGTARP
2014; GMAC Financial 2008b). The Fed required GMAC to convince 75% of bondholders to
accept equity in exchange for debt and existing shareholders to invest new capital.
On December 29, 2009, when GMAC was unable to meet the threshold on their own, the
Treasury stepped in with a $5.25 billion investment package (Nygaard n.d.). Of that total, $5
billion was used for an outright purchase of GMAC preferred shares (Treasury 2008a). The
remaining $250 million came in the form of a warrant to purchase additional preferred
shares.12 The warrant was exercised immediately (COP 2010).
On December 31, GMAC said that bondholders had agreed to exchange $17.5 billion of bonds
for cash, new bonds, and new preferred stock; the exchange represented 59% of outstanding
bonds, short of the Fed’s 75% target (GMAC Financial 2008e). Still, bondholders sustained
substantial losses. GMAC reported a pretax gain on the debt exchange of $11.5 billion,
including a $3.8 billion principal discount, a $5.4 billion discount representing the difference
between the face value and the estimated fair value of the new notes, and a $2.3 billion
discount representing the difference between the face value and estimated fair value of the
new preferred stock (GMAC LLC 2009a, p. 145).
GMAC also raised $1.25 billion in a rights issue and $0.75 billion in subordinated debt from
GM and Cerberus, announced on January 16, 2009 (GMAC LLC 2009a, p. 70). However, the
Treasury provided an $884 million loan to GM, which GM used to subscribe to its portion of
the rights issue for shares in GMAC. In addition to the shares purchased directly, on January
16, 2009, the Treasury also provided an $884 million loan to GM, which GM used to buy
shares in GMAC (Treasury 2009b). GMAC was also required to “convince 75% of
bondholders to exchange their notes for discounted preferred stock that would count as
capital (SIGTARP 2013).

The shares purchased outright paid an 8% dividend, and the shares purchased via the warrant paid a 9%
dividend (COP 2011).
12
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First Round of SCAP Assistance
In February of 2009, the Treasury announced that they would be conducting “forwardlooking assessments to evaluate the capital needs of the major U.S. banking institutions
under a more challenging economic environment” (Treasury 2009d). GMAC was one of the
19 institutions required to participate. The results of the test, released in May 2009,
indicated that GMAC needed to raise its capital level by an additional $11.5 billion13 (BdofGov
2009a).
On May 21, 2009, when GMAC was unable to raise the required capital, the Treasury
purchased $7.9 billion of GMAC shares. In a similar format as the December 2008 investment,
the Treasury purchased $7.5 billion outright and immediately exercised a warrant for an
additional $375 million. In the same announcement, Treasury indicated that the $884 million
loan to GM made in January 2009 was being converted into GM shares (Ally Financial 2012).
After the day’s actions, the Treasury’s stake in GMAC represented 35% of the company
(Treasury 2009c).
Within this $7.87 billion capital injection round, $4 billion was used to assist GMAC in its
acquisition of Chrysler Financial’s floor plan financing work with Chrysler (COP 2010). See
Nye 2021 for more details.
Second Round of SCAP Assistance
Despite the large Treasury investment in May, by early November 2009 GMAC had still not
met the $11.5 billion capital threshold required. The Federal Reserve announced that, of the
10 institutions required to raise additional capital following the SCAP, GMAC was the only
one to fail to do so (BdofGov 2009b).
On December 30, 2009, Treasury made a capital investment of $3.9 billion in GMAC. The
injection included $1.3 billion in preferred equity and $2.7 billion in trust preferred
securities14 (Ally Financial 2012). Following this third series of investments, which included
the conversion of some conversions of preferred shares into common equity15 (Treasury
2009c).
In December 2010, the Treasury converted $5.5 billion of preferred shares to common
equity. This final conversion brought Treasury’s ownership of GMAC to what would be its
peak ownership of 74% (Treasury 2010b).
Government Guidelines for Voting Shares
Under the terms of Treasury’s $884 million loan to GM, GMAC and its shareholders agreed
that the governance of GMAC would change in the event that Treasury’s stake in the company

Of the total $11.5 billion required, $9.1 billion had to be new Tier 1 capital (BdofGov 2009a).
As in the previous investments, a small portion of these total figures were warrants that were exercised
immediately (Ally Financial 2012; Treasury 2009c).
15 See Treasury 2009c for more details.
13
14
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grew. The shares that GM purchased with the Treasury’s loan were placed in an independent
trust, the trustees of which temporarily had the right to select directors of GMAC’s board.
On May 21, 2009, Treasury exercised its option to convert its loan to GM into a XXX% stake
in GMAC, and the parties revised the governance agreement to increase the size of the board
to nine members (GMAC LLC 2009c, p5). The temporary independent trust was abolished.
Under the new agreement, Treasury would have the right to designate more directors as its
equity stake grew (see Figure 4).16
Figure 4: Treasury Ownership Percentage

GMAC LLC 2009c, p.5.

In a June 2009 speech, President Barack Obama described the government’s position as one
of “a reluctant shareholder” (Obama 2009b). Most of TARP’s investments were in the form
of non-voting preferred stock; however, the interventions in the auto industry did involve
voting ownership (Treasury 2010b). As early as 2009, and peaking in December 2010 at
74%, the Treasury owned a significant portion of GMAC common shares (Nygaard n.d.).
Two principles that would guide Treasury’s use of voting rights were announced:
(1) Treasury intends to exercise its right to vote only on certain matters consisting of
the election or removal of directors; certain major corporate transactions such as
mergers, sales of substantial amounts of assets, and dissolution; issuances of equity
securities where shareholders are entitled to vote; and amendments to the charter or
bylaws; and (2) on all other matters, Treasury will either abstain from voting or vote
its shares in the same proportion (for, against, or abstain) as all other shares of the
company's stock are voted. (Treasury 2010b).

COP reported that Treasury staff considered an ongoing trust structure as a possibility for Treasury shares
but concluded that a trust ‘‘does not enhance our position.’’ Transcript of COP Hearing on GMAC, (COP
2010a).
16
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Wind-down of Treasury Investments
Regarding the wind-down of its investments, Treasury noted, “the goal is to dispose of the
government’s interests as soon as practicable . . . and in a timely and orderly manner that
minimizes financial market and economic impact” (COP 2010). In congressional testimony,
Treasury representatives outlined a number of steps GMAC needed to take before the agency
divested of its shares in GMAC, including: (1) refinancing its debt, (2) increasing balancesheet liquidity, (3) gaining access to the third-party credit markets, (4) bringing down the
cost of capital, (5) hiring good staff, (6) supporting and expanding a retail bank, (7)
containing a deeply troubled mortgage subsidiary,17 and (8) preparing for an IPO. The
representatives indicated that since an IPO would require the company to be on a path to
profitability, Treasury might be required to hold onto the shares longer than anticipated
(COP 2010).
The final preferred shares that Treasury owned were sold in March of 2011 (Treasury
2011a). Because of Residential Capital’s (ResCap) poor financials, GMAC’s originally targeted
IPO date, first scheduled for 2011, didn’t happen until 2014. In 2012, ResCap filed for
bankruptcy (Massad 2012). The wind-down of the Treasury’s common equity shares began
in 2014 and can be seen in Figure 5 (Nygaard n.d.).
Figure 5: Treasury’s Stake in GMAC Over Time

Source: Treasury press releases (Nygaard n.d.).

Among the many reasons for GMAC’s financial troubles in 2007 and 2008 was their ownership in ResCap, a
residential mortgage company (GMAC LLC 2009a). For undetermined reasons, the government decided not to
force ResCap to separate from GMAC before the Treasury’s investments (COP 2010). Because of ResCap’s poor
financials, GMAC’s originally targeted IPO date, originally scheduled for 2011, didn’t happen until 2014 (Massad
2012). In 2012, ResCap filed for bankruptcy (Massad 2012).
17
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Outcomes
GMAC rebranded itself as Ally in May 2010 (Ally Financial 2010a). The bank holding
company ended its emergency use of the Fed’s discount window and Term Auction Facility
in the summer of 2010 as well, repaying all borrowed principal with interest (Nygaard n.d.).
The Fed also collected fees on GMAC’s use of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility
(BdofGov n.d., GMAC 2008b). After multiple term asset-backed securities issuances
supported by the Fed’s Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, GMAC conducted a
successful issuance without government support (GMAC 2010b).
In the final quarter of 2012, GMAC repaid all the senior unsecured debt it had issued under
the FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (Ally Financial 2012). This program
included fees paid to the FDIC (FDIC n.d.).
Between December 2008 and December 2009, the US Treasury invested more than $17.2
billion in capital in GMAC. The final sale of Treasury’s equity in GMAC was completed on
December 19, 2014. The total return on the series of investments was $19.6 billion, for a
taxpayer profit of $2.4 billion (Treasury 2014a).
In February 2010 GMAC was able to successfully issue unsecured long-term debt and in mid2010 was able to turn a profit (GMAC 2010a; COP 2011).
GMAC continued to support ResCap following the Treasury capital injection. GMAC provided
ResCap roughly $3.3 billion in 2008 and $4.0 billion in 2009. 18 Uncertainty about the
potential for further losses at ResCap forced GMAC to delay its initial public offering (IPO),
originally planned for 2011. GMAC paid $2.1 billion to settle claims in ResCap’s bankruptcy
in 2013 (Ally Financial 2013b).
The final sale of Treasury’s equity in GMAC was completed in an IPO on December 19, 2014.
Treasury ultimately recovered $19.6 billion on its investments in GMAC, a taxpayer profit of
$2.4 billion (Treasury 2014a).

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. The government provided assistance that enabled GMAC to avoid filing for
bankruptcy.
Given the market stresses that it was experiencing, in the fall of 2008 GMAC consulted with
the FDIC, Treasury, and the Federal Reserve about strategies for how it might survive the
crisis. It was out of these meetings that the plan to convert into a BHC arose, the application
for which GMAC submitted on November 20, 2008 (COP 2010). We have not been able to
The 2008 figure includes $0.8 billion of forgiveness of debt in ResCap’s GMAC Mortgage Servicing Rights
facility and $2.5 billion through contributions and forgiveness of ResCap debt held by GMAC. The 2009 figure
includes “cash, mortgage loans held-for-sale (which GMAC acquired from Ally Bank), receivables, [and] the
forgiveness of debt and affiliated payables.
18
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determine the full scope or timing of these discussions, but it appears that these discussions
might also have been the impetus for GMAC’s applying to access the discount window and
TAF.19
An alternative option that was considered, but eventually rejected as unpalatable, was to
allow GMAC to file for bankruptcy (Rattner 2010, 147). One of the reasons for providing
support so that this would not happen, cited in a 2010 congressional review, was that adding
a third auto-related bankruptcy would increase the disruption to the economy caused by the
potential bankruptcies of GM and Chrysler (COP 2010). The report cited the view that a
GMAC bankruptcy could have impeded the pending merger between Chrysler and Fiat and
disrupted GM’s own access to funding, a result contrary to the purpose of the Automotive
Industry Financing Program (AIFP) (COP 2010).
2. The government deployed a variety of tools, broad-based and specific, to support
GMAC.
In seeking to provide assistance to GMAC and to help it develop a strategy for survival
through the crisis, the government had a variety of facilities and mechanisms to recommend.
GMAC accessed a number of programs that the government had established to address the
severe stresses caused by the crisis and a number of other regulatory mechanisms (see
Figure 1 above). Of all the assistance, however, only the approval of the BHC conversion
required a unique determination in that other aid relied on standing programs (Discount
Window), broad-based emergency programs (TAF) or already established limited programs
(SCAP and AIFP). That the government had such a wide toolkit to use in developing a strategy
for GMAC was a function of the structural complexity of GMAC, timing, and the government’s
willingness to assist it.
GMAC owned an industrial loan bank, GMAC Bank, that was already eligible to access the
Discount Window. Applying for access in September 2008 involved merely the standard
application, establishing an account with the Fed and depositing eligible collateral to secure
any loans. Access to the Discount Window was granted in September 2008 and also provided
access to the TAF.
Within weeks of consulting with the government, GMAC accessed other crisis-era liquidity
programs, including the CPFF and TALF. These programs were two of the several that the

According to the COP, based on interviews with GMAC staff, “In response to deteriorating market conditions,
significant third quarter losses, and the prospect of looming fourth quarter losses, on November 20, 2008,
GMAC requested the approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Board) under
section 3 of the BHCA to become a BHC upon the conversion of GMAC Bank to a commercial bank. GMAC took
this step after conversations with the FDIC and Treasury about strategies for surviving the financial crisis.
GMAC’s management maintains that the final decision to seek BHC status was a joint decision resulting from
discussions between GMAC management, the board of directors, Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC”
(COP 2010).
19
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Fed implemented in 2008 to “unstick” various markets that locked up after the Lehman
bankruptcy. Had GMAC experienced troubles in 2007, these programs would not have been
available, and government assistance would have had to be more customized.
The Fed’s was willing to expedite GMAC’s application to convert to a BHC (including both the
first and second 23A waivers), which made it eligible for TARP and the FDIC’s TLGP. It is also
characterized by Treasury’s willingness to consider GMAC under the umbrella of the AIFP,
which originally targeted just auto manufacturers, but grew to assist related components of
the industry.
3.

The government’s assistance to GMAC was consistent with its overall aid to the
auto industry under the AIFP and more general assistance programs.

The Treasury’s investment in GMAC was funded through the Automotive Industry Financing
Program (AIFP), the umbrella program under which the government’s targeted assistance
to GM, GMAC, Chrysler, and Chrysler Financial was structured (U.S. Treasury 2019b), as
shown in Figure 1. GMAC also benefitted from several standing and unique programs
implemented by the Federal Reserve and the FDIC. The AIFP also included financial
assistance to certain companies in the auto manufacturing supply chain and funds to
guarantee warranties (U.S. Treasury 2014b). The Treasury predicated its assistance to nonmanufacturers on the integrated nature of the auto industry. Accordingly, its assistance to
GMAC was explained in similar fashion given the position of GMAC as provider for GM dealer
and customer financing.
4.

The assistance to GMAC was authorized under several laws.

The various elements of the multi-faceted assistance extended to GMAC were authorized
under a number of laws as shown in Figure 6. A majority of the programs were in place in
September 2008 when GMAC first sought assistance, and several came on track during the
next month. They were with the exception of the BHC and SCAP/AIFP20 broad based plans.

20 While the AIFP was announced in December 2008, the SCAP was not implemented until early 2009.

The 14thlargest BHC following its conversion, GMAC was one of the 19 financial institutions first subject to the SCAP
stress test and capital requirements.
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Figure 6: Emergency Facilities Accessed by GMAC
Agency

Federal
Reserve

Facility Accessed

Attributes of Facility

Authority

Discount Window/TAF

Standing, broad based

Sec. 10 of the Federal Reserve Act
(FRA)

CPP

Emergency, broad based

Sec. 13(3) of the FRA

TALF

Emergency, broad based

Sec. 13(3) of the FRA

BHC conversion

Expedited approval

12 CFR § 225.16

FDIC

TLGP

Emergency, broad based

FDIC systemic risk exception (Section
141 of the FDIC Improvement Act of
1991)

Treasury

SCAP/AIFP capital
investments

Emergency, limited

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
(EESA)

Source: Federal Reserve.

As discussed, the Treasury made three capital investments in GMAC, in each case receiving
preferred stock and a warrant to purchase common shares.
Between December 2008 and December 2009, the US Treasury invested more than $17.2
billion in capital with GMAC (U.S. Treasury 2014a). The investment was spread out over a
series of three investments. The first of these investments was made on December 29, 2008,
with respect to helping GMAC meet the capital requirements to convert to BHC. The second
was made in May 2009.
While the Treasury had the option to provide GMAC with the required capital through the
CAP, SCAP’s associated program, the Treasury financed GMAC under the AIFP instead. The
Treasury stated “that we used the AIFP instead of the CAP because GMAC was already part
of the AIFP and because it did not make sense to open the CAP for only one institution when
that institution could receive funding elsewhere” (COP 2010).
5.

The government communicated to the public its assistance to GMAC via regular
press releases and public comments from high-ranking officials.

On the occasion of each additional program, loan, and policy decision, the government issued
a press release. Due to the wide range of interventions, the relevant press releases came from
the Treasury, the Fed, the FDIC, and on at least one occasion a joint statement from all three
(see the References section for relevant links).
In addition to the technical press releases announcing specifics and term sheets, the rescue
of GMAC and the broader auto industry was given significant public attention by President
George W. Bush and Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. (White House 2008). The crisis

204

The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module D

Matsumoto and Nygaard

in the auto and financial industry spanned a change in presidential administrations.
President Obama continued the path started by President Bush by keeping the auto industry
rescue in his communications to the public (Obama 2009a).
The auto industry was such a large aspect of the economy and affected so many jobs that the
government’s actions were closely watched and discussed in the broader public. One of the
widely publicized efforts by the new administration was a special task force that was set up
specifically to tackle the auto industry crisis (Wall Street Journal 2009).
6.

The Federal Reserve Board expedited GMAC’s conversion to a bank holding
company.

GMAC filed an application to convert to a BHC on November 20, 2008, which was approved
by the Board on December 24, 2008, a timetable that reflected waiver of the requirement
that it provide 30 days for relevant federal and state authorities’ approval 21 (BdofGov
2008e). The Fed issued an order that specifically addressed the reasons for its expedited
review:
In light of the unusual and exigent circumstances affecting the financial markets, and
all other facts and circumstances, the Board has determined that emergency
conditions exist that justify expeditious action on this proposal in accordance with
the provisions of the BHC Act and the Board’s regulations…

For the same reasons, and in light of the fact that this transaction involves the
conversion of an existing subsidiary of Applicants from one form of a depository
institution to another and the retention of Applicants’ existing nonbanking
subsidiaries, the Board has also waived public notice of this proposal (BdofGov
2008e).
Such expedited approval was similar to the Fed’s approval of conversion to BHC for Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley (BdofGov 2008a; BdofGov 2008b). Conversion to a bank holding
company potentially made GMAC eligible for the FDIC’s TLGP program, although the FDIC
did not approve its participation until May 2009. GMAC eventually raised $7.4 billion in
FDIC-guaranteed debt.

21 The Fed did contact such agencies which did not object to the approval (BdofGov 2008e).
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The Federal Reserve granted two Section 23A exemptions to GMAC in connection
with its conversion to a bank holding company to allow it to continue lending to
consumers and dealers.

GMAC requested two exemptions from Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act and the Fed’s
Regulation W—first, in December 2008, in connection with the BHC conversion, and second,
in May 2009, in connection with the SCAP funding round (BdofGov 2008d; BdofGov 2009b).
Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act and Regulation W limit to 10 percent of the bank’s
capital stock and surplus the amount of transactions from a single affiliate, and to 20 percent
the amount of transactions from all affiliates (BdofGov 2008d). At the time of the first, GM
had yet to divest from GMAC and thus, GM was considered an affiliate of GMAC Bank. As
noted above (see Background) GMAC’s interconnection with GM was significant.
The first exemption covered consumer loans. It permitted GMAC Bank to “lend to consumers
to enable them to purchase automobiles from unaffiliated dealers in the United States that
obtain floorplan financing from affiliates of GMAC Bank” (BdofGov 2008d).
On December 24, 2008, the Fed granted the first exemption, after consultation with the FDIC,
noting that it would “benefit the public because it would allow GMAC Bank to extend credit
to a greater number of retail customers”. Furthermore, the Fed stated that the exemption
would “provide an important source of financing for U.S. retail purchases of GM vehicles from
independent dealers and avoid further disruption in the credit market for such purchases”
(BdofGov 2008d). The Congressional Oversight Panel noted that, “While the Board
historically has required a parent company to provide a collateralized guarantee when it
transfers assets to an affiliate, it did not obligate GMAC to provide collateral here because
‘GMAC’s financial position will be strengthened by an additional equity investment by
Treasury.’’ As a result, the Board determined that ‘Treasury’s support helps ensure that
GMAC will be in a position to honor its obligations under the guarantee’” (COP 2010b2010).
The second exemption in May 2009 covered both consumer loans and loans to dealers. It
permitted GMAC Bank to “lend to consumers to enable them to purchase automobiles from
unaffiliated dealers in the United States that obtain floorplan financing from Bank or
affiliates of Bank (“Retail Loans”) and to provide floorplan financing to unaffiliated dealers
(“Dealer Loans”) to purchase automobiles from General Motors Corporation” (BdofGov
2009b).
Treasury’s auto team believed the loans to dealers were not very risky, but FDIC staff
expressed concerns about funding them through the insured bank (Rattner 2010, p. 171).
(As noted, the FDIC was also hesitant to extend the TLGP guarantee to GMAC.) Sheila Bair,
Chair of the FDIC at the time, notes in her memoir that she told Treasury she would reject
GMAC’s second 23A waiver and the TLGP guarantee unless the Treasury increased the FDIC’s
credit line and the administration supported legislation to increase the FDIC’s ability to
demand loss-sharing from the biggest banks. “On May 20, 2009, legislation was enacted with
the authority that we needed, and we followed through on our end by agreeing to the 23A
waiver and guaranteeing about $7 billion in GMAC debt [through the TLGP program]” (Bair
2013, 176-180).
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In exchange for its capital injections, Treasury acquired GMAC preferred shares
and warrants to purchase common shares.

The auto manufacturers granted to the collateral agent, Citibank, a continuing first priority
security interest in their pledged collateral in order to secure the Special Purpose Vehicles’
financial obligations to the secured parties (Citi and Treasury 2009)
9.

Treasury received warrants as a way to add value for taxpayers.

With each Treasury investment in GMAC, the Treasury was issued stock warrants. These
warrants were exercised immediately each time.
10. In conjunction with GMAC’s converting to a BHC, Treasury also financed GM’s
purchase of GMAC equity.
To ensure that GMAC met the capital level required by the BHC conversion, and in addition
to the direct capital injection, Treasury agreed to make a loan to GM for up to $1 billion to
purchase GMAC shares. GM ultimately borrowed $884 million from the Treasury to
participate (Treasury 2009b). The loan agreement, dated January 16, 2009, noted that GM’s
obligations to the Treasury could be satisfied by GM’s transfer of the purchased GMAC
common shares to Treasury (COP 2010). Treasury exercised that right in May 2009,
acquiring the additional GMAC shares (Ally Financial 2012).
11. Treasury required certain operational restrictions from GMAC as part of the
capital injections.
In addition to certain ownership and management changes required as a condition to
converting to a BHC, GMAC was required to comply with certain terms and conditions under
the Treasury capital injections. These included restrictions on: stock repurchases, dividends,
and executive compensation, and expense policy requirements similar to those Treasury had
required from GM (SIGTARP 2009).
12. Treasury did not require GMAC to submit a viability plan, as it had for the
automakers., or specifically require a strategy to deal with ResCap.
It is not clear from public documents whether the government considered requiring GMAC
to restructure its holding in ResCap prior to the provision of government support. The two
companies were closely connected. In addition to holding ResCap’s equity, GMAC’s 2008 10K noted it still had $4.1 billion in secured financing arrangements with ResCap and $500
million of ResCap notes as of January 31, 2009, after the debt restructuring. An accelerated
bankruptcy would have been difficult and costly to GMAC. “We have extensive financing and
hedging arrangements with ResCap, which could be at risk of nonpayment if ResCap were to
file for bankruptcy… In addition, should ResCap file for bankruptcy, our investment related
to ResCap's equity position would likely be reduced to zero. Based on January 31, 2009,
balances, this would result in a $3.1 billion charge to our investment in ResCap.” (GMAC LLC
2009a, p.15).
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In 2010, GMAC’s CEO described the company’s strategy toward ResCap at a COP hearing:
“[T]he focus of our activities has been… to quantify the risk in ResCAP, to ring-fence that risk,
and over time, to minimize that risk so that GMAC is freed from that burden, going forward.”
He also alluded to systemic risk issues, noting “the important role of ResCAP as the fifth
largest mortgage servicer to three million homeowners with $376 billion of outstanding
mortgages” (COP 2010a).
Following the capital injection, GMAC transferred mortgages from Ally Bank to ResCap, COP
noted. “With the capital contribution in Ally Bank, GMAC purchased high-risk mortgage
assets at ‘fair value’ of $1.4 billion, resulting in a pre-tax charge of $1.3 billion. GMAC then
contributed these high-risk assets to ResCap” (COP 2010b, p.44). Another expert witness
told the COP: “Ally Bank wrote down a lot of assets, moved them to ResCAP, because they
want to isolate the bank from the bad things that are going on at ResCAP” (COP 2010a).
13. Treasury directed part of its second capital injection into GMAC to support the
broader auto industry stabilization plan.
The second capital injection, in May 2009, included $4 billion to support GMAC’s acquisition
of Chrysler Financials’ floorplan financing work with Chrysler. The Congressional Oversight
Panel indicated that this acquisition was a small addition to GMAC’s already sizable $26.5
billion in wholesale automobile loans (COP 2010). The Treasury pledged to support GMAC
by providing financing to Chrysler, pursuant to which Chrysler would transfer the funds to
the Dealer LLC which would be used solely to reimburse GMAC for losses that may be
incurred in connection with the agreement (Treasury 2009).
14. Treasury set the timeline for their sale of shares in GMAC to “as soon as
practicable” while minimizing financial market and economic impacts.
Regarding the wind down of Treasury’s investments in GMAC, COP noted, “the goal is to
dispose of the government’s interests as soon as practicable...and in a timely and orderly
manner that minimizes financial market and economic impact” (COP 2010b2010). In
congressional testimony Treasury representatives outlined a number of steps GMAC needed
to take before Treasury divested of its shares in GMAC, including: (1) refinancing its debt,
(2) increase balance sheet liquidity, (3) gain access to the third-party credit markets, (4)
bring down the cost of capital, (5) hire good staff, (6) support and expand a retail bank, (7)
contain ResCap, and (8) prepare for an IPO. The representatives indicated that since an IPO
would require the company to be on a path to profitability, Treasury may be required to hold
onto the shares longer than anticipated (COP 2010).
The final preferred shares that Treasury owned were sold in March of 2011 (U.S. Treasury
2011b). The wind down of the Treasury’s common equity shares began in January 2010 and
ended in December 2014 (Nygaard n.d.).
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III. Evaluation
GMAC accessed multiple programs at the Fed, the FDIC, and the Treasury. Each of the
agencies saw a positive return from GMAC’s use of their programs either through
administrative fees or sale of GMAC shares (see the Outcome section for details). GMAC’s
return to profitability in the first quarter of 2010 (GMAC Financial 2010) and access to public
funding markets suggests that the programs, as a whole, provided enough support for GMAC
to stand on its own.
There have not been any academic reviews of the government’s interactions with GMAC.
However, there was one useful, public commentary in a March 2010 Congressional Oversight
Panel report. The executive summary outlines the underlying purpose of GMAC’s rescue:
“There is no doubt that Treasury’s actions to preserve GMAC played a major role in
supporting the domestic automotive industry.” They noted that “industry analysts and
market participants who were consulted by the Panel overwhelmingly agreed that GM and
Chrysler were heavily reliant on GMAC and Chrysler Financial” (COP 2010). The Panel’s
implication was that without GMAC, it is unlikely that GM and Chrysler would have been able
to restructure and achieve financial viability.
However, without questioning the government’s decision to invest in GMAC, the Panel
suggested that there might have been missed opportunities “to increase accountability and
better protect taxpayers’ money” (COP 2010). The Panel suggested that other solutions
existed that may have been considered yet were rejected. Notably, it says that the Treasury
failed to design a restructuring of GMAC and did not require the firm to draft a detailed
viability plan or provide details about its use of taxpayer funds. It’s unclear whether these
were actually considered and rejected. With respect to a possible bankruptcy, which seems
to have been considered and rejected by Treasury as not effective given the potential
bankruptcies of GM and Chrysler, the Panel was “unconvinced” (COP 2010).
The Panel also concluded that Treasury also did not “provide the public with much
information” and worried about the “fundamentally illiquid” investment made in GMAC, a
private company (COP 2010). As a 2015 Congressional Research Service noted, the decision
to make (or switch to) common equity investments meant that the Treasury took on
additional risk (Webel and Canis 2015). In 2014, when the final shares were sold for a profit,
it was apparent the risk had paid off. However, at the time of the investment this was far
from a sure bet.
A report by the Special Inspector General for TARP (SIGTARP) in 2013 noted that “GMAC’s
TARP assistance was also markedly different [than the assistance to the auto manufacturers]
because Treasury never required GMAC to submit a viability plan outlining how it would
resolve substantial liabilities that had led to historic losses” (SIGTARP 2013). The report
hypothesizes that the difference in treatment was due to Treasury’s uncertainty regarding
how to handle the subprime mortgage component of GMAC’s business.
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0TARP%20Investment%20in%20GMAC.pdf.
(Treasury 2010b) Treasury Converts Nearly Half of Its Ally Preferred Shares to Common
Stock
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(White House 2008) President Bush Announces Plan to Aid Auto Makers
White House press release webpage on the first aid programs of 2008 for the auto industry
under TARP.
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Media Stories
(Wall Street Journal 2009) A Look at Obama’s Auto-Bailout Team
Wall Street Journal article outlining the resumes of the main figures on the Treasury
automotive rescue team.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/look-obamas-auto-bailout-team.
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(COP 2010) The Unique Treatment of GMAC Under the TARP
Congressional Oversight Panel analysis of the use of TARP funds in the support of GMAC and
Chrysler Financial. Analysis centers on GMAC but also covers Chrysler Financial in spring 2009.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/cop_report_20100310.pdf.
(COP 2011) An Update on TARP Support for the Domestic Automotive Industry
Congressional Oversight Panel report updating analysis and recommendations related to the
creation, implementation, and issues raised by the automotive bailout.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/cop_report_20110113.pdf.
(Webel and Canis 2015) Government Assistance for GMAC/Ally Financial: Unwinding the
Government Stake
Congressional Research Service analysis of the GMAC interventions and the government’s
efforts at exit.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/government-assistance-gmacally-financial-unwindinggovernment-stake.
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